C. Geertz and Twentieth Century Chinese Cultural Discourse

Cheng Nong

The indulgence in discussion of cultural problems is a striking phenomenon running through the 20th century Chinese history of ideas. Beginning from the end of the Qing Dynasty, the discussion has been going an continually with upsurges repeatedly initiated. Although once depressed and left to the borderline discourse of several scholars under the historical situation, nevertheless the discussion would revive whenever the situation loosened and only now does it incline to an end. Such a discussion, indulging in the relationship between Chinese and Western culture and the plans of cultural reform and so an has constituted the twentieth century Chinese cultural discourse.

This paper attempts to demonstrate what the discourse was, through the study of an individual case, that is, the misreadings Clifferd Geertz, the American cultural anthropologist met with in the Chinese intellectual environment. I believe that such misreadings happened because of the antagonism between Geertz's vision of culture and assumptions of the Chinese cultural discourse's core.

Geertz's vision of culture and the understanding of the social process of the line of reasoning included in it will be discussed in Part One and Part Three of this paper. And in Part Two and Part Four, we will examine the misreadings in the light of their preceding chapters and observe the powerful dominating force of the assumptions about cultural discourse's core.

I . "The Extrinsic Theory of Thought" and

the Interpretative Anthropology

In Geertz's essays,(1J there appear two representative definitions concerning the concept of culture. One was made in the mid-1960s: "(Culture) refers to the meaning mode handed down from the history and embodied in symbols and the handed -down conceptual system incarnated as various symbolic forms whereby people exchange, maintain and develop knowledge about life and their attitude towards life" (1973, 89). The second was made at the beginning of the 1970s, "the concept of culture I maintain. . . is essentially a semiological concept. Like Marx Weber, I also hold that human beings are animals hanging an the web of meanings they themselves have woven. In my opinion, culture is just the web of these meanings and so the analytic culture is the interpretative science exploring meanings rather than the experimental science seeking laws. " (1973 , 1975) Although both definitions touch upon the essence of Geertz's understanding of culture, yet it is not easy for us to grasp this essence if we start our discussion directly from these definitions.

Shumpeter initiated the distinction between "vision" and the conception analysis tool and illustrated this with an example that Keynes' special vision of economic process had been formed as early as 1919 and during the years from 1919 to the completion of "A General Theory" in 1936 , he had completely devoted himself to the search for the formalization and conceptualization of this vision. (2~ Naturally, no hard and fast line can be drawn between vision and its conceptualization. However, it is necessary for the tactics of our discussion to make a distinction between the two in view of the unusualness of the key terms in Geertz's definitions of culture quoted above such as, "symbol" , "meaning" and "conception" . Instead of getting entangled in these definitions, I should like to first probe into Geertz's vision - - i. e. , his sensibility of the ontological dimension referred to in the conception of "culture" . And through such an investigation, the implications of the two definitions will naturally be clear.

In fact, Geertz has good reason to make a distinction between vision and conception. "Symbol" , "meaning" and like always connotes a certain kind of parastructuralism and paralinguistics, but Geertz's vision is in essence the profound concrete sense of the concrete flow of action, his own formulation being: "try to return from the elusive world of the symbol and semantic process to the (apparently) more actual world of sentiment and system" (1973 , 214) . This superficial inharmoniousness encourages J. C. Alexander to determine that Geertz's points of view are inconsistent and he says that he favors the establishment of the theory of cultural symbols but he is concerned about social actions. " Geertz is seemingly about to adopt the visual angle of semiology . . . . Nevertheless, we shall soon find that these symbols, according to Geertz, almost cannot assume cultural tasks . . . . He describes meaning as something additional and as an action not only involving the regulations concerned but also other phenomena"[31; "he will not spend much time in trying to comprehend the inner structure of cultural system and what he is concerned about is the action rather than the order. "(41 Mr. Alexander does touch the core of Geertz's vision but unfortunately his judgment an this fact fails to be accurate (this point will be made clear in the ensuing discussion). Geertz writes: "We must pay attention to action and our concern should be more actual and accurate because it is through the flow of action, or more accurately , through social actions that the cultural forms can be integrated . " (1973 , 17) Any social theory cannot avoid illustrating action and will have to deal with the relationship between action and structure. The feature of Geertz's theory is that action is subordinated not by structural constraint but structure is understood by action, in the way of which, social action is given the most important position in the theory of noumenon. Therefore, he is considered as one of the leading exponents of the theory of action in the 1980s. Such concern about action is of course not the pure visualization of phenomenology. Virtually, in accordance with the two elite theories of twentieth century analytic philosophy , the study of symbols and psychology , Geertz explicitly set forth what he called "the extrinsic theory of thought" early in the 1960s(5~ , and laid the ontological foundation for the core position of action. Against this background, Geertz gradually understood anthropology as text explaining and reached the standpoint of interpretative anthropology. In this section, we will develop our discussion according to this clue.

In Geertz's employment, the word "thought" means much. It neither limits itself to what is usually called the intellectual aspect ( Geertz simultaneously talked about the intellectual aspect, the sentimental aspect and the motivational aspect) nor simply refers to the static state ( Geertz uses thought and thinking alternately) . Roughly speaking, it implicates what is usually called the entire mental aspect. The gist of "the extrinsic theory of thought" includes: denying that thought is the simple human inner life; believing that human thought is basically both social and public, and, that thought, as the psychological event, is only subordinate and secondary. This fact can be analytically distinguished into two dimensions : (1) thought , as ability, idea, attitude, sentiment and so on, is not the independent existence in "consciousness" but can only be displayed through concrete actions ; (2) the proceeding of human thought must rely an the action operating the objective materials (including the body of man himself) .

Now, let's first discuss the first dimension. The discussion of "mind" is a theme in the Western philosophy tradition, especially in the modern tradition of epistemology since Rene Descartes. (6) In the middle of the twentieth century, Ryle's "Conception of Mind" (1949) and W Wittgenstein’s "Philosophical Investigation" (1953) came out in succession and both of them created elite viewpoints which turned out to be important resources for Geertz. In short, Ryle produced the concept of "disposition" referring to ability, ideation, motivation, attitude, sentiment and so an which, different from psychological events or the stream of consciousness as transient sensations (for example pain) , are a group of "inclinations" and "intentions" . They are neither psychological events nor physical events. In fact, "disposition" is neither event nor substance. It is only a possibility. The possession of a certain kind of disposition means the easy happenings of some physical and psychological events. Geertz once quoted a paragraph of illustration from Ryle: "When hearing somebody is vainglorious, we will be able to predict that he is going to adopt some ways of behaving such as: liking to talk about himself without cease; being attached to the society of celebrities; refusing criticisms from others; liking to be worshipped; disliking to talk about others' strong points. We predict that he will wallow in his own fond dream of success, avoid recalling the defeats he suffered in the past and rack his brains as how to be able to be one - up an others. The so - called vainglory of somebody is his inclination to take the above and other numerous similar actions. Of course, we can also predict that such a person will feel low and uneasy an some occasions. He will fall into a deep depression when his name is forgotten by a celebrity but will be an the high ropes an account of gloating over the misfortunes of his opponents. "(7) It is obvious that "disposition" cannot be directly sensed because it is not a concrete event. Only in the light of someone's various concrete behaviors can we acknowledge it. When these concrete behaviors are linked up to form a certain integrated character, we will say that someone possesses the disposition corresponding to that character. In principle, the means through which a person senses his own disposition, like the means through which he discovers the disposition of someone else, similarly must depend an the Integration of numerous concrete behaviors in normal times. For instance, if someone wants to realize his mathematic gift, he has to do a lot of math exercises; if someone wants to realize his sense of religion, he also has to observe the contact results with factors concerned. Although we can say, according to the truism that people can experience their own psychological events, it is more convenient for people to understand themselves than to understand others, yet this is only limited to some respects. In other respects, sometimes someone else who is more objective can understand a person's disposition better than he himself does. Ryle illustrated this by using the example that it is not easy for those who are vainglorious to understand themselves.

Such a viewpoint has cleared up a great deal of confusion since Descartes time. According to Descartes' conception of "mind" , disposition and psychological events are combined into the unitary "consciousness", antagonistic to which is "material". This results in dualism which mind and material are separated. Thanks to Ryle and Wittgenstein's analysis, Descartes' theory of "mind" has been demolished. Ryle sums this up accordingly: "In the traditional theory of mind, the type distinguishing of disposition and its manifestation is wrongly considered as the mysterious dual antagonism between the invisible psychological cause and the visible physical result. "(81

It should be noted here that from the perspective of disposition, ideas and culture are not entirely separate. The so - called idea does not refer to Lock's "idea" of "mind" of Descartes' style and does not mean either one's memorizing and being able to state some representations (one's repeated declarations that the spirit is immortal do not prove that he really thinks so). Just as Ryle clearly expounds, someone's having a certain belief , knowing a certain concept and mastering a certain theory means that he is likely to do some deeds and to acquire some experience under some circumstances. "To master Euclid's axioms, one not only can repeat them but can solve their applied exercises, refute censures an them and measure farmland with them". 191 Wittgenstein's analysis of understanding" and "knowing" also expresses the same fact. [10] As a matter of fact, thought not only can not be separated from ability, but is also interlinked with sentiment and motivation, which is proved by the disciple's concept of "God". In concrete discussions, our disintegration of these contents is always analytical rather than ontological. Geertz's honest acknowledgement of this fact may be seen from his mentioning the various respects of the mental process of thought.

Following the example of Ryle's discussion, Geertz definitively defines "mind" as "disposition" , holding that "mind is neither action nor thing but is the organized system of various dispositions which are demonstrated in some actions and matters. " (1973 , 58) He explains that in this way, the commonly referred "spirit speciality" and "psychological force" are made to break away from darkness and the field of private experiences that cannot be approached and to enter into the daily world that can be observed so that we can explore disposition as easily as we know about the fragility of glass and the inflammability of paper (1973 , 96) .

Let us turn to the other dimension of "the extrinsic theory of thought" . The reason that thought is public and visible lies in its dependence in essence an manipulation of objective materials and thus it is an extrinsic and public action. "The thought as the private action and unnecessarily to seek help is but the sub - ability although useful . " (1973 , 76) What is involved here is actually the generating and maintaining of disposition. Geertz illustrates with the example that, only first by the aid of paper and pen or by moving his fingers about while learning calculation, is a little child gradually able to "do sums in his head" ; people usually first learn to read loudly and then to read silently; in the West, not until the Middle Ages did people learn to read silently; and, "unless when not so casual, we shall not - - like the little old Lady described by William Faulkner - - realize what we think about until we see what we mean" (1973 , 76 - 77) which means that it is more foundational to think through speaking than to ponder and ponderation itself is a kind of complicated achievement.

Geertz's discussion also centres an the generating of sentimental disposition. He quotes Langer's theory of sentimental forms, believing that only through the organizing of a series of sentimental models ( also called " sentimental concepts" ) can our physical sensations become sentimental attributes. And by this, we can make definite and effective sentimental responses to various concrete situation and will not be at a loss. Such sentimental models can only be acquired by culture and this acquisition is also the public behaving process, the typical example of this being the activities of religious rites, "the core rites of religion - - such as Mass, pilgrimages and the carnival of the Austrian natives - - these are the symbol forms of a certain sense of holiness and an attitude of dedication (here the form of action is more adopted than the form of language) and the constantly repeated holding of the rites usually generates a sense of holiness and attitude of dedication in the participants (1973 , 216 ) . Geertz made a famous analysis of the cockfighting game in Bali, his important argument stressing that the game is a sentimental education for the Balinese. In the relatively peaceful society of the Balinese, cockfighting is one of the rare sights of a life - to -death struggle and it is the sentimental violence, the public action process, which makes the Balinese experience various violent sentiments. "With cockfighting games, the Balinese's experience of this kind of sentiment will be much more shallow " (1973, 447). In a word, Geertz holds that "the growth, maintenance and disintegration of sentiments, attitudes (they are ` feelings' in the sense of state rather than the immediate experiences and impulses) , just like the rational deliberation , are essentially not human's intrinsic activities of privacy" (1973 , 81) .

The differentiating of these two dimensions of "the extrinsic theory of thought" as stated, ( 11 ~ is of course only analytical. In the practical process , these two dimensions are of an organic whole. An action both expresses disposition and shapes and maintains it at the same time. In other words, in the flow of action, disposition is both expressed and is reprocessing as well . Thus , human thought is in essence public

162 Chinese Social Sciences Yearbook ,1998

and social, occurring in "the courtyard, the market and the town square instead of " in the mind" (1973 , 45) . "The chessboard, the platform, the scholar's desk, the judge's chair as well as the office and the football court are just the various arenas of mind" (1973 , 56) .

Such a theory obviously supplies a powerful demonstration for the essential Position of social actions and from the perspective of research methods, the Position of action is similarly outstanding. Because thought process is essentially involved in public social actions, we are in principle, likely to understand thought process through identifying action. The inference seems obvious but it is not so easy for us to grasp the essential implication of it. In the mid - 1960s when "the extrinsic theory of thought" was being formed, Geertz was still limited to a general positivist standpoint, his thinking that the standpoint , like other social sciences , can prove the study of anthropology is the science of positivism and can similarly make culture is acknowledged through the experimental survey (1973 , 360 - 364 ) . Several years later , Geertz gradually comprehended that the attestation process of a certain culture through the visible action is not essentially the Positivist study by observation and generalization, but has the nature of textualism. In his paper entitled "The Indulging Gamble: An Annotation of the Cockfighting in Bali" published in 1972, Geertz clearly stated that cultural studies are neither the survey of law by Positivist science nor the decoding of ciphers by structuralism, but are the interpretation of text.

To illustrate why the study of action deduced from the above statements may result in the standpoint of interpretative anthropology, it is necessary for us to look to M. Polanyi's theory of knowledge. Although Geertz has never named Polanyi when discussing his own understanding , yet Polanyi's theory of knowledge can precisely indicate the reasoning in reaching the standpoint of textualism from the vision of Ryle's style.

Starting from "the extrinsic theory of thought" . i. e. , the vision of Ryle's style, we can in principle infer that since thought expresses itself externally as action, thought can be recognized through the recognition of action. The case is just as Ryle states: "When Boswell describes how Johnson does his writings, talks, eats, is restless with anxiety and impassioned, he is actually describing Johnson's mind". [12) Thus, an anthropologist's cognition of the extrinsically shown action of a certain culture is his cognition of the "mind" of that culture. However, in the eyes of Polanyi, it is absurd for Ryle to believe that the extrinsically shown functions of "mind" (i. e. , actions) cumulate to become the contents of mind. These actions, if observed separately, will not make sense. If we want to make them meaningless, we must place them into a context which can accomplish this purpose only by fusing and integrating these actions. This is apparently "the recycling of interpretation" though Polanyi did not employ the terms of textualism. In "recycling" , by repeated efforts of arranging from the Part to the whole and then from the whole to the Part, a successful Integration will finally form and the parts will form meaning in the whole. Polanyi illustrates with the example of the process of a chess player's study of the master chess players' art: "he does not `simplify' the master players' mind into the chess compositions they make but instead, he dwells in these compositions and detects the strategy in the master players' mind with these compositions as the auxiliary clue. Only with the Integration considered as that of an entirety can these compositions be significant and similarly , only with the Integration regarded as that of the whole mind can a person's ordinary behaviors carry meanings. "(t3) " A person's mind is the meaning of these functions of his mind. "(14) Polanyi prompts that such a cognition process has a "from - to structure" , and "we understand the joint meanings of matters by dwelling in matters instead of by focusing our look at them. "(15~ In other words, in cultural studies, one will not only observe and gaze at actions but rather, must rely an actions all along so as to seek their integration. Such a kind of cognition is of course not the Observation and generalization of logic positivism; in fact, it is, without form regulations to follow, a sort of individual action in nature. Whether or not and in what degree the cognition of Integration can be successful are matters without any regulation for guidance.

Although Geertz did not produce any autobiographical introduction to his thinking, we can still infer something from the above discussion about the complete course of his marching from discussing the positivist science of culture in the mid - 1960s to definitely refuting experimental science and stressing textualism in the early 1970s. Here was no break - up of his thinking and the standpoint of textualism had dwelled in the general plan to inspect and recognize culture by action. After his detailed discussion that cultural studies are the interpretation of text in his paper about cockfighting published in 1972 , Geertz published another two papers in 1973 and 1974 respectively entitled, "The Theory of Penetrating Description: To the Interpretative Theory of Culture" and "According to the Viewpoints of Locals: The Nature of Anthropological Understanding" , discussing in more detail the standpoint of the interpretative anthropology. He pointed out that culture should be considered as text and the various concrete actions are the symbols of this text . The anthropological interpretation asks researchers to start from symbolic action to manage to follow what locals do. The harder locals' actions are managed to follow, the more logical and locally - featured they will appear (1973 , 14) . Geertz clearly hinted that this is not at all the so -called "transference" and the researcher does not at all imagine himself as a local (1984 , 56. "Transference" is the assertion possibly made starting from Descartes' definition of "mind") . Virtually, this practice of "managing to follow" is almost equal to that of "dwelling in" stated by Polanyi, being the effort to integrate the various actions by striving to harmonize them. This is naturally an individual creative effort without regulations and Geertz thereby emphasizes that the anthropological Interpretation is "something of fiction" and the endless "penetrating description" . From the cause of the standpoint of textualism, we can easily see that textualism is the peculiarity of anthropological studies rather than a simple "method" of research.

Starting from the clue mentioned above, it is not difficult for us to comprehend Geertz's implications of "symbol" , "meaning" and "concept" , the use of which apparently differs greatly from the general use of semiology.

So far as "symbol" is concerned, Geertz thinks that culture should be understood as the text written in action and the so- called "symbols" of this text just refer to the various concrete actions. Therefore, the action is also called "symbolic action". We have quoted previously Alexander’s criticism that Geertz argued against himself while turning the study of symbol into the study of action. Now we can clearly realize that Alexander's criticism did not make sense. No contradiction is found here. "Symbol" in Geertz's writing here had nothing to do with structuralism, but has a close link with the process of concrete social actions. It is at the same time when he declares that this is not at all the decoding of ciphers by structuralism and the study of symbolic action is actually the study of anthropology (1973 , 448 - 449) . As a matter of fact, in Geertz's definitions of symbols which are formal, all the "symbols" are made to refer to concrete actions, events, processes and objects instead of the abstract forms. (16)

The above quotations from Polanyi have demonstrated the implications made by Geertz here of "meaning" . In the background of Descartes' separation of mind and body, the "meaning" of symbol is very easily regarded as the inward idea represented by symbol and this kind of idea is "something arising in one's mind while one is thinking" and "having an idea is just equal to being perceptive". (17~ This obviously confuses disposition with psychological events, which makes shown the fault of the private theory of meaning represented by Rock. If the meanings of symbols lie in the fact that symbols stand for the ideas in one's mind, cultural studies will have to be carried out with "transference" as the approach. In fact, this theory of meaning was long before negated by the development of analytical philosophy. "At least since Wittgenstein and Cyrus, it seems very clear that the "meanings" of the graphic symbols are not the additional "non - material" nature these symbols have but only the place they deserve in the context constituted by the events around in language games and life forms. "(18] Here, Geertz conscientiously takes Wittgenstein's theory of meaning as his basis. In his programmatic paper "The Theory of Penetrating Description" , Geertz explicitly demanded that Wittgenstein's criticisms of the privacy theory of meaning be connected with the realm of anthropology (1973 , 12) . Actually , what Wittgenstein was quoted frequently by Geertz is his argument that "meaning is use" (for example, 1973, 17, 405n; 1983, 118). Geertz believes that the "meaning" of (symbolic) action is its position established in a context which is integrated through that action and other action events around interacting an each other and being interrelated. The "meaning" of action generates through the localization of this entirety. It is worth mentioning that Geertz also includes Weber's "meaning problem" into such a clue of discussion. According to his quotation from Weber, Weber's "meaning Problem" stresses that things are not a matter of "where they happen only" but a matter of "they have a ` meaning' and where they appear because of the meaning" (1973 , 253). Geertz stated somewhere else that meaning is not something innate in objects and actions but is endowed to them , which is emphasized by many scholars such as Weber, Durkheim and others (1973 , 361) . In one paper published in the 1980s, Geertz straightforwardly traced the orientation of his own textualism back to Weber: "The tendency that social theories increasingly regard social actions as the epitomization expression of meanings, strictly speaking, started from Marx Weber and Freud"(19~ (1983 , 233) . And this is in contrast to the mystery made by some domestic scholars of the "meaning Problem" .

The word "concept" and some synonyms Geertz also uses now and then such as ideas, sense, perception, belief and so on, are easily regarded as the psychological entity recurring to the mind. They might be confused with psychological events in the background of Descartes' type, but may roughly be considered to mean "disposition" in Geertz. As stated above, having a certain concept and having a certain ability are interlinked. Sentimental disposition is also called "sentimental concept" , which can be seen from Geertz's adoption of this term (see 1973 , 93 - 95 , 405) . This "concept" or "concept system" owned by people in a certain culture basically cannot be stated verbally; people only tacitly understand it and from it know how to act properly in concrete situations. Because of this characteristic, Geertz points out while quoting Wittgenstein that confronted with an unfamiliar culture, one will not be able to understand the locals even if he has a good command of their language (1973 , 13) . Culture cannot be mastered verbally and it can only be mastered through cognitive Integration. This principle is the same for anthropologists.

As our discussion goes so far, the two definitions quoted at the beginning of this chapter become unequivocal. Generally speaking, the definitions made in the 1960s practically correspond to the two phases of "the extrinsic theory of thought" . For one thing, the meaning mode and conception system are representative as symbolic forms (action, event, etc. ) ; for another, people generate and maintain knowledge and attitudes of various kinds by these symbolic forms, i. e. , the various meaning modes and conception systems. The definition in the 1970s was made from the typical standpoint of textualism. The first point is the ontological definition and the second point is the definition of the theory of knowledge are supplementary.

II . The Misreading of Geertz

The thoughts of Wittgenstein, Ryle, Langer and others were rather fully interpreted in China in the 1980s. There are two authentic Chinese versions of "The Concept of Mind" published respectively by Beijing Commercial Press and Shanghai Translation Press; the Chinese version of Langer's "sentiment and form" , accompanied by his teacher's being an vogue, is also specular. The introduction to and study of Wittgenstein's thought running through the 1980s never cooled down though the Chinese version of "The Study of Philosophy" was not published until 1992. And there were even no introductory articles an Polyani from the early to mid - 1980s. Most of these ideas were included in subjects directly related to them , (for instance , the theory of meaning and symbolic aesthetics, etc. ) and few commentators linked them with the discussion of culture. Nevertheless, the rather large - scale diffusion at the least shows that the Chinese mainland intellectual circles are not devoid of the background knowledge for the understanding of Geertz.

The entrance of Geertz's theory into the Chinese mainland at the very beginning was bound up with the revival of the discussion of cultural anthropology. For example, several books brought and recommended by American anthropologists who were invited to give lectures in Fudan University and Shanghai University in mid - 1980s included "Local Knowledge" published not long before(Z°) , and meanwhile, some papers also occasionally mentioned Geertz though not in elaborate detail(Since 1987, various outlines of anthropology and Chinese versions of relevant foreign works were published in large numbers. Much of these related to Geertz. The positive and special introduction to and interpretation of Geertz's theoretical standpoint was related to the culture fever arising at that time. There are two examples of this : (1) the publication of the full text of the Chinese version of "The Theory of Penetrating Description" translated by Yu Xiao in the first collection of papers entitled "Culture: China and the World" edited by the "Culture: China and the World" with an Editorial Board made up of a group of Beijing young scholars in 1987 ; (2) the publication of Lin Tongqi's paper entitled "Geertz's `Penetrating Description' and Outlook an Culture" as an introduction of Geertz's outlook an culture in Chinese Social Science ( vol. 2 ) in the spring of 1989, when the cultural fever rose up with the opportunity of celebrating the 70th anniversary of the May 4th Movement. The journal which carried the translation is the authentic series publication in the cultural fever, while the journal which carried the thesis is the authentic officially - run journal. Both of the two publications occurred in the " mainstream band" cultural discourse. In the following paragraphs, we are going to see how Geertz is interpreted in these two cases. CZ2)

Yu Xiao's most typical misreading lies in the end of the third chapter of his translation. Now, let's first see Geertz's original statements. ". . . to say that culture consists of socially established structures of meaning in terms of which people do such things as signal conspiracies and join them or perceive insults and answer them, is no more to say that it is a psychological phenomenon, a characteristic of someone's mind, personality, cognitive structure, or whatever, than to say that Tantrism, genetics, the progressive form of the verb, the classification of wines, the Common Law, or the notion of a ` conditional curse' (as Westermack defined the concept of `ar' in terms of which Cohen pressed his claim to damages) is" (1973 , 12 - 13) . The sentence pattern of "no more. . . than" has a negative connotation. So if the context is contrasted, the main idea of the above sentence is found to criticize the viewpoint of cognitive anthropology to regard culture as a psychological structure and to emphasize the removal of the privacy theory of meaning. But Yu translates the sentence in a positive way, admitting in principle the state that "culture is a psychological phenomenon" but failing to distinguish between disposition and psychological events.

This understanding of equating disposition and psychological events with the general "psychological phenomenon" can be seen in the interpretative reading elsewhere. In discussing the so - called anthropological interpretation, we should see what a thing means from the standpoint of the doer, to which, Geertz answers: "what it means is that descriptions of Barber, Jewish, or French culture must be cast in terms of the constructions we imagine Barber , Jews , or Frenchmen to place upon what they live through, the formulae they use to define what happens to them . . . . ". Yu understands the statement in his Chinese version as: "The statement means that descriptions of Barber, Jewish, or French culture must be cast with the constructions we imagine Barber, Jews, or Frenchmen to place upon what they experience , the idiomatic expressions they use to define what happen to them . . . . " (277) .

What Geertz wants to express in this sentence is how anthropologists manage to follow locals' behavior so as to understand their culture that cannot be explicitly stated. At the end of the preceding chapter, Geertz just quoted Wittgenstein to prove that even if one has a good command of the language of a strange culture and can understand discussions in that culture, he will still fail to understand the locals there. And at the beginning of this chapter, Geertz also makes it clear that it is the task of the anthropological interpretation to arrive at understanding. Obviously, Geertz intends here to refer to the cultural conception and mode that cannot be explicitly stated. Therefore, the phrase of "in terms of" here should mean "in the light of" rather than "with some words". Similarly, "formulae" here should mean "equation" rather than "idiomatic expression" , analogically referring to meaning mode and the like. [Z3~ The reading of Geertz in Yu's translation here, influenced by Descartes' idea of "mind" , fails to recognise the silent comprehension of culture that is not easy to explicitly state.

It is natural for Yu to feel it difficult to know "the extrinsic theory of thought" because he is not clear about the distinction between disposition and psychological events. In this respect, the understanding and translating of the word "public" is the striking example. The word means "of people in general" , "publicly - owned" and so an but also means "known to people in general" and "in front of everybody" , such as in the phases "to make a public protest" , "to make a secret public" and "a public address" . There are two places when the word " public" is used in the following two sentences by Geertz: "Culture, this acted document, thus is public, like a burlesqued wink or a mock sheep raid" (1973 , 10) ; " Culture is public because meaning is" (1973 , 12) . Yu Xiao translates both of them into "gong zhong suo you de" (publicly - owned) and translates "acted document" into "wei zuo de wen xian" ( counterfeit document) . I point out that at the end of Section One and at the beginning of section Three of this paper concerning such a statement of Geertz, that anthropological description is just like reading an article written in action. Not to mention the core weight of this conception in Geertz, from the context of the discussion clues alone, we can be quite sure that the "acted document" refers to "the document written in action" . Yu Xiao's mistranslation apparently results from his lack of understanding of Geertz's concept of action. As stated in the preceding chapter, from the standpoint of Geertz , thought outwardly represents itself as various actions in principle , and actions are of course public and can be observed. Furthermore, the "meaning" of action generated through the mutual interlinking of actions is not the meaning of privacy arising in the mind, but can be in essence publicly cognized. In the sense of inference, culture as a "meaning model" is public. In Geertz's formulation that culture is public, the antonyms to "public" are "private" and "secret" . The word "private" , like "public", is open to different interpretations, which we will not discuss here, but "secret" can be used to furnish the counter-evidence that "public" has the implication of "being known to people in general" . And parallel to public/secret is overt/covert. Obviously, the word "public" here means "known to people in general" and the implication of the word is - - rather than "publicly - owned" - - "observable" , "tangible" and "accessible" , thus making cultural studies possible and practical.

What is thought - provoking is that the misreading in Lin Tongqi's paper is almost identical with the mistranslation by Yu Xiao. The slight difference between the two lies in that, if the misreading in Yu's translation can be revealed in a complicated way only from his translation, then the misreading in Yu Xiao's paper - - because it is in the form of a thesis - - is a straightforward statement. What is interesting is that the statement of Geertz quoted above stating that culture is not a psychological phenomenon, is also quoted in Lin Tongqi's paper, and he too misreads the statement as positive, just as Yu Xiao's translation does. Lin writes: "but Geertz stresses the popularization of culture and denies that culture is a psychological phenomenon. What he attempts to negate is the privacy of psychological phenomenon. Geertz points out when we say that culture consists of socially established structures of meaning in terms of which people do such things as signal conspiracies and join them or perceive insults and answer them , we are indeed saying that culture is a psychological phenomenon, a characteristic of someone's mind, personality, cognitive structure, or whatever. But they are common and can be generally discriminated as we say that Tantrism, genetics, the progressive form of the verb, the classification of wines, the Common Law . . . . are psychological phenomena and the characteristic of someone's mind, etc. " (171) It is not important that there are differences between Lin's translation and Yu's translation in grammar. What is important is that Lin believes more definitely than Yu that Geertz agrees to regard culture as a psychological phenomenon, only to emphasize at the same time that this does not stop culture from being owned and known by the public. This shows an one hand the confusing of disposition and psychological events in Lin's paper and shows an the other that such a confusion is closely related to the misunderstanding of "public" as "popularization" and "commonness" rather than the understanding of publicity" .

The integration of disposition and psychological events is the line running through Lin Tongqi's paper. While briefing Geertz's theoretical position in American anthropological circles , Lin's paper maintains that the American anthropological theories have fallen into two categories since the 1960s - - one is the theory with materialist color regarding culture as the system that fits in with the environment and "the other regards culture as the idea system, holding that culture consists of subject factors such as perception, iconic imagery, abstract concept, sentiment, values, attitude and so on. "The latter can again be divided into three schools, i. e. , cognitive anthropology, structuralism and the theory represented by Geertz (167) . Under the cover of the ambiguous terms such as "the idea system" , "the subject factors" and so on, psychological events such as perception and others and the dispositions such as abstract concept, values and attitudes become integrated. Since Geertz's theory has been placed under this precondition, correspondingly, the understanding of such terms as "symbol", "meaning", "concept" and so an are open to mistakes. Now, let's first discuss the word "conception". Lin explains in his paper: "The word of conception here does not refer to the product of abstract thinking in particular but refers to in general the entirety of people's impression on, idea of and attitude to something, including their inward sensations, perceptions, iconic imagery, ideation and feeling, concept of value, belief and so on, which can contain either the abstract concept with succinct summary or detailed and minute vivid images. For instance, when we mention the Puritans' "idea of the hell" , we want to refer to the various inward responses aroused by hell in the minds of the Puritans, including some images of hell, the painful and dreadful sentiments it arouses and the Puritans' moral concepts, their theological and philosophical system. " (108 - 169) Here, the confusion of disposition and psychological events is clearly seen. Similarly, the word "meaning" is also understood along with the train of thought of Rock's theory of meaning and under the treatment in Lin Tongqi's paper, it becomes the other way round, the direct proof that Geertz regards culture as a psychological phenomenon; "since Geertz essentially understands culture as a `meaning structure' and meaning itself is of idea, so he admits that culture is of idea. " (169) In the conclusion of his paper, Lin thinks, in the light of "meaning web" that Geertz's culture is included in the usually - stated "scope of mind and thought" (175) . As to "symbol" , Lin's paper also stresses the respect of the abstract form and adds "symbolization" to the definitions of concrete things Geertz originally referred to, emphasizing the symbolic function. More typical are the Chinese versions of the two quotations. One is a definitional illustration of symbol in Geertz's statement that "the material vehicles of perception, emotion and understanding" (1973, 408) , in Lin's translation of which, is left out the word "material" (173) which, as the definite attributive modifiers emphasizes that the "vehicles" are concrete and specific. The other original text is: "thought does not consist of mysterious processes located in what Gilbert Ryle has called a secret grotto in the head but of a traffic in significant symbols" (1973 , 362) . In his translation of this sentence, Lin deliberately leaves out Gilbert Ryle and fails to make expressed the implication made by Geertz concerning the action to operate symbols which, according to Lin's translation, seem to be the existence that can act automatically. Besides, as mentioned thereinbefore, Lin's paper, like Yu Xiao's translation, translates "public" all into "commonness" and "popularization" rather than "publicity" . In terms of the Interpretation in Lin Tongqi's paper, to say that culture is public is "to believe that culture is a phenomenon that can be commonly perceived and recognized by the public" (169) . Just as shown above , th
ese translations and readings are closely related to one another and such an interpretation of "public" matches with the understanding of culture as a psychological phenomenon.

However, Geertz has after all given much space to "the extrinsic theory of thought". Therefore, it is impossible to avoid this completely in a paper an Geertz's outlook of culture. Thus, we have found Lin's paper intentionally or not, adopting a series of "tactics" to deal with this theory that cannot be included in its nature of experience. One of Lin's tactics may be called isolation. At the beginning of Lin's paper, the readers are told that Geertz's two collections of papers involve a wide range and "if these papers are understood as an entirety, Geertz's academic thoughts can be roughly divided into two major parts: one includes the method of cultural analysis (i. e. , the method of the so - called ` penetrating description' and culture outlook (or cultural conception) ; the other touches upon the general theoretical framework and philosophical basis by which to analyse the entire human society. But it is doubtlessly very difficult to make a distinction between the two. Owing to space limitations in this paper, I can only makes an introduction to the former - - that is, Geertz's method of penetrating description and outlook of culture" (160 ) . But the readers have not been giver an answer as to how difficult it is to make a distinction between these two parts. Relying an the statements above, however, Lin's paper can indeed ignore some inferences without much response. The first section of my paper has proved how impossible it is to make a distinction between the so - called "philosophical basis" and the outlook of culture , and the third section will discuss the relationship between vision and the general framework of its social theories. What the discussions in these two chapters present are enough to show that it is difficult for Lins paper to make clear Geertz's train of thought while separating out culture for independent discussion. The second tactics employed in Lin's paper, can be called marginability, the typical example of which is that, while discussing "the commonness of culture", Lin Tongqi writes "this viewpoint of Geertz's can be understood in three layers: first, he holds that since culture consists of meaning structures which are embodied in emblematic §ymbols which . . . can be commonly differentiated, then culture can naturally be commonly differentiated too and is therefore common; second, he thinks that meaning itself is common; third, he further believes that thought is common as well . . . . " (170). As stated above, "commonness" itself is a misreading. With this point put aside, in the discussion above of "commonness", "the extrinsic theory of thought" has been placed from "the centre" an to "the border" and represents the collaterality of " the commonness of culture" . The third tactics of Lin Tongqi may for the moment be called argumentation - - to include for discussion some arguments that should be read and comprehended out of the intrinsic logic of Geertz's vision into another irrelevant clue, resulting in the invisibleness of the essential implication. The example in this respect is the discussion in Lin's paper of "The Systematization of Culture" . This paragraph of discussion which covers more than two pages, begins and ends both in the manner of discussing the systematization of culture. But within one page and more of statements , Lin turns to discuss in more than one page statements that meaning cannot be hanged high above the sky and cannot be separated from social practice, with the following statement as the thread of discourse that "Geertz, while discussing the nature of culture, does not so much emphasize the systematization of culture as emphasizes the non - systematization of culture" . This obviously shows that the clues of these two questions are entangled. After all, whether or not culture is systematic and integrand and that such as systematic integration is of the process of the practical action rather than of the abstract "meaning field" are two separate matters. In terms of A. Giddens, the former is the macro "systematic analysis" while the latter the process of the
social noumenon. Talking about the former means placing the latter between brackets to let it suspended. (24) And only if it is included into the clue of "the extrinsic theory of thought" can the latter be made clear and with the angulated discussion of it as is made at the present time, the conclusion can only be "so, the Integration and systematization of culture is not a phenomenon far from daily life and enclosed in the logic world , but the product of the experience of human life" (173) . Thus, its essential significance in Geertz's theory ( see Chapter Three) is slipped through a limited affirmation.

Apart from the above two cases of translation and writings, there are some more examples of translating and reading to be taken as evident. For example, in the sweeping introduction to "the symbolic anthropology", included in Wang Hailong's book entitled "An Introduction to Anthropology" completed in 1988 and published at the end of 1989 , among the representative figures of which Geertz is arranged to stand at the first place, summing up the author said "although cognitive anthropology , French structuralism and symbolic anthropology appeared before and after the middle of this century and in the 1960s are found different in their respective theoretical system and research approach, yet they all attempt to search for the answer to social and cultural phenomena in the minds of human beings. "(25~ Here, Geertz is placed into such a framework of classification similar to that of Lin Tongqi's paper. There are still some other domestic books an anthropology involving Geertz, most of which abstract Geertz's discussions of some specific questions but fail to discuss his outlook an culture in a positive way. But even in these concrete quotations, Geertz's vision is not responded to. For instance, in the Chapter "Religion" in Tong Enzheng's "The Cultural Anthropology" completed in 1987, Geertz's paper entitled "The Religion as Cultural System" is quoted for several times, which spares the space of one page and a half to quote Ryle's theory of disposition so as to define religious sentiments and motivations. Tong Enzheng's book states: "According to Geertz, the function of religious symbols is to induce the disciples' response to religious consciousness, which refers to human intrinsic moods and motivations, i. e. , the sensations in specific environments. "(26~ This practice of terming religious sentiments and motivations definitely classified by Geertz among disposition while defining them "the sensations in specific environments" shows that the distinction between disposition and psychological events concerned fails to be given an explanation and Geertz's discussion covering one page and a half concerning disposition are not responded to.

Obviously, when Geertz is read in China, his vision of culture is always missed, avoided or even distorted, moreover, Geertz is astonishingly even given the cold shoulder, an two occasions. The first example is A Concise Dictionary of Cultural Anthropology completed in 1989 , published and with the deadline up to the end of 1987 for data sources, in which, unexpectedly there are no entries introducing Geertz and interpretative anthropology. (27~ The second example is that in both Studies of Ethnonymics and Translation Series of Ethnonymics which are the leading Chinese anthropological journals do not introduce Geertz in a positive way. Ironically, Translation Series of Ethnonymics an the contrary carries the Chinese revision of a paper by another American anthropologist , Keesing , criticizing "The Symbolic Anthropology" , in which Geertz is of course the main target to be criticized. X281 In contrast to this, the school of cultural psychology headed by Benedikt and Mid and the social psychology of Engels and so an in the theory of modernization are in Chinese scholars' good graces and translation and introductory works are numerous.

To connect all this , we can believe that no matter how many other reasons there are, the most important reason that Geertz is misread in China lies in the existence of the powerful prejudice against him, i. e. , the idea of Descartes' "mind" which integrates disposition and psychological events. Here, the formulation of the idea of the so-called Descartes' type derives from Ryle and Rorty, and only as a substitute, it has nothing to do with the concrete philosophy of Descartes. As far as the failure of distinguishing between disposition and psychological events is concerned, this idea exists within the quite different concepts of dialectical materialism , the determinism of the new Confucian culture and so on.

In fact, the antagonism between Geertz's points of view and the idea of Descartes' "mind" has aroused some questions. Lin Tongqi's paper furnishes a typical example in this respect. In the "Conclusion" to his paper, Lin writes: "In the discussions of the connotation and denotation of the concept of culture in recent years, the scholars of our country roughly continue to use such antagonic concepts as mind/matter, thought/matter, or intrinsic/extrinsic to make definitions . . . . In quite a different way, the couple of major concepts Geertz employs in his definitions are symbol/ meaning rather than mind/matter. Indeed, he does say that culture is a web of meaning that is of ideas and implicitly, culture can be said to belong to the scope of mind or thought; but he emphasizes that meaning, as is common, is always embodied in Symbol and therefore the natural residence of meaning is not in the minds of individuals but in such social arenas as the house backyard, the market and so on. In this sense, culture seems to be different from what we usually call the phenomenon of mind or thought . " (175) . This question he raises almost touches an the essence of the matter, but there are no further inquiries in Lin's paper. This obscure question at least helps give an idea where it is most likely for Geertz and Chinese cultural discourse to collide.

III . The Tension of the Ontological Vision of Noumenon and the Framework of Multicomponent System

- - The Social Theoretical Implication of Geertz's Vision of Culture

To further investigate the distorted implication of Geertz's vision, we must first look further into the social theoretical implication of Geertz's vision of culture.

With the formulation stated above of Shumpeter, we call Geertz's understanding of cultural ontological "vision" doubtlessly to eliminate the interference from different interpretations of symbolic concepts and to explore his essential train of thought an the one hand and an the other, just because Geertz's cognition of the ontological process of culture has not been fully unfolded and the cognition itself contains the resource that can be developed into the theory of social ontology. Here I want to emphasize one of the important characteristics of the understanding of social ontology contained here, that is, it is hard for the cognitive framework in which culture and social ontology are made to separate from each other to become available, and this will result in different understandings of social changes.

As is discussed in Chapter One, Geertz's vision of culture pays attention to social actions, emphasizing the interwovenness of cultural modes (disposition, concept System, meaning structure) and the flow of action. Action generates and develops with the aid of cultural modes and is the representation of cultural modes; meanwhile, action process is the process in which cultural modes get regenerated and maintained. However, in Geertz, this vision, relying an action is in principle limited to the cultural dimension ( at least it was so in the 1960s, detailed information thereafter) while what directs Geertz to understand the whole social process is the social theory of Parsons.

The starting point of Parsons' social theory originally is social action too and he "attempts to develop the analytical theory of social action system" . By his theory of action, Parsons believes that the interpretation of action must involve three dimensions, i. e. , culture, society and personality and is thereby conceptualized as "the reference framework of action", that is, the cultural system, social system and personality system of action. According to Gidden's explanation, this theory of action created by Parsons is completely wrong. Owing to his attention to "Hobbes' problem" , i. e. , the solution to the order problem, Parsons accentuates the importance of the common view of cultural value which becomes the motivation of the personality system through socialization and the standard of the social system through institutionalization. And then, structure is compelled to become natural pre-installation and the willfulness of action virtually disappears. Here, the theory of action has actually become structural sociology in which the cultural system and social system come to be the most real existence. (293 Although Parsons claims that system is only an analytical conception(3°1 in terms of Neo - Kantianist theories of knowledge and with the standpoint of "analytical realism" , yet his study around the nature of these systems and their interrelation will unavoidably lead to reification which is likely to be unavoidable especially when the system is considered as a functional entity.

Geertz himself supplied the example of such reification, in his paper entitled "Rites and Social Changes: An Example of Java" published in 1959. This paper principally holds that only by equally treating cultural and social layers and regarding them as mutually irreducible can one deal with the problem of changes. Though Geertz claims in this paper that this is only an analytical distinction between the social respect and the cultural respect in human life, while concretely analysing the case of this paper - - a conflict incident happening in an Indonesian small town in the process of transformation, he maintains that the conflict resulted from the backward -ness of the cultural mode and the progressiveness of the social interaction mode. Here cultural and social layer are apparently considered as the existence of actual noumenon and they are made relatively independent. The logic of this reification is revealed in that to implement his train of thought in analysing this individual case, Geertz will have to draw a clear line between culture and society and will even strongly oppose the ambiguous formulation that culture affords social system a standard through institutionalization. Geertz writes: "The former (referring to culture) is regarded as the orderly meaning system and symbolic system which social interactions rely an while the latter (referring to society) is regarded as the mode of social interaction itself . On one layer is the framework consisting of belief , expressive symbol and value with which individuals define the world, express their sentiments and make judgments; an the other layer is the constant process of interactions whose sustained form is called social structure by us. Culture is the meaning structure with which people explain experiences and direct actions; social structure is the form action assumes and the actually -existing network of social relations. " According to such a classification, the linkage between the culture and action process is cut off and "action" is included in the social system. Then, Geertz goes an further to quote from Sorokin concerning the distinction between "the integration of logic meaning" and "the integration of cause and effect - - function" to further distinguish between culture and society, stating that "the integration of logic - - meaning, characteristic of culture and referring to the integration form people have found in Bach's fugue and in the creed of Catholicism or in the general relativity theory, is the interconsistency of styles and of logic implications and the unity between meaning and value. " (1973 , 144 - 145) Apparently such an attempt to make a strict distinction between culture and society has made culture turn into Pythagorean' mysterious "meaning field" (statement made by Geertz himself in 1966) .

This culture/society dualism is difficult to cohere with Geertz's vision of culture according to which culture and action process cannot be separated. Cultural mode takes an the form of action and is regenerated by action, "only through the flow of action . . . can cultural forms get integrated , " (1973 , 17) and the integration of cultural logic - meaning will be inconceivable without action process. What culture concerns is precisely the symbolic dimension of action, i. e. , the pattern and mode of action. While illustrating by example the generation of symbolic actions such as religious rites and so an into religious feelings, Geertz states by quoting from Ryle that what we are talking about here is the pattern of action (1973 , 216) . Thus, if society - - in terms of Geertz's definition quoted above - - is interaction mode itself and social structure is action form, then, the distinction between culture and the social noumenon will not hold up. The practical process is a uniform process and the repeated regeneration of the particularly - patterned action takes an the form of a structural nature and such a process in return shapes and regenerates culture, disposition or conditions for regeneration. It is obvious that the mode structure (society) revealed by the constant regeneration of action pattern and the disposition (culture) revealing itself as action pattern are interlinked in content. As a matter of fact, the integrativeness of this flow process is constantly seen in Geertz's various concrete discussions. In the paper entitled "The Politics of Meaning" for example, discussing Indonesia's Politics and culture after her independence, Geertz writes: "Culture is not sacrificial rites and custom but is instead the meaning structure with which people gives form to experience; politics is neither group and nor system but is one of the major stages an which these meaning structures open up before the public. " (1973 , 312) This is the demonstration of the integrativeness of the process of this flow from the respect of culture. While touching upon the effect of the 1965 incident, the paper states again that "This country has been all along remaining in the impossibility of violent changes of the conceptual matrix operating in her only because it strikes its roots deep down into Indonesia's social and economic structure realities which keeps unchangeable. " (1973 , 325) This is, however, to emphasize the integrativeness from the respect of society. In this hint, both the assertion by Geertz that cultural studies are sociological analyses (1973 , 91) and his assertion that the studies of symbolic actions - - like the ones of group, section administration system and the change in the position of American women - - are sociological studies (1973 , 213) have had more incisive impact.

Giddens and Geertz were both narrators of the theory of action in the 1980s. Here, the quotations from Giddens will help make the social theory import indicated and induced by Geertz's vision. Giddens definitely seeks to establish an ontology of social life and his structuration theory is simply the product of this attempt. In terms of the structuration theory, the basic field of social sciences neither includes the subjective experience of individual actors nor the existence of social structures in whatever form, but is about social actions or social practice carried out in time and space. This is because social practice affords the foundation on which either action subject or social object is shaped. Thus, the various dualism in social theories such as individual/ structure, subject/object and microcosmic/macrocosmic, etc. should be all dispelled. There in fact only exists one social action process in which structural nature is either the basis action resorting an or the product of action, that is, action is performed by citing the structural nature and meanwhile is regenerating it. It is impossible for us to discuss in detail the complicated argument of the structuration theory here and what has something to do with the discussion in this section is that in Geertz, "structure" covers the contents usually referred to respectively with "culture" and "structure" which are regarded as the two dimensions of social relations - - i. e. , the syntagnatic dimension as institutional mode and the paradigmatic dimension as the rule. For one thing, "structure" as the rule (also as the resource) is grasped by actors and for the other, "structure" as the institutional feature is revealed by the constantly regenerating action. Such a conceptualized design lays much stress an the integrativeness of culture and society, serving as a footnote to Geertz's affirmation that "social form is the matrix of culture" . (31)

It is clear that there is tension between Geertz's ontological vision and Parsons' multivariate system framework and when this multivariate system tends to reach reification, the tension will become a contradiction. In fact, it is because Geertz is pushed by this theoretical logic that he becomes estranged from Parsons. If we arrange Geertz's papers chronologically, it will not be difficult for us to see the flux and reflux of the multivariate framework and the vision of noumenon. Next, let us observe this change so as to comprehend more of Geertz's vision social theory.

It is not easy for people today to realize the key role of Parsons in the establishment of modern sociology, whose multivariate system provide the effective analytical framework for the study of experiences. Indeed as Geertz states, social theories are devoted to making an analytical distinction between culture and social structures so that they can deal with the spiritual factors in the social process and at the same time will not go so far as to slide down to the two - kind theory of reducibility of Hegel or Marx (1973 , 361) . At least in the study of empirio - positivism that emphasizes the pursuit of law, ontology cannot easily furnish a conceptual framework available for direct use, the embarrassment of which has been touched upon by some debaters. (32)

Therefore, it is indeed very natural for Geertz who was a disciple of Parsons to rely an Parson's multivariate framework. Of course, he did so in the 1950s ("Rites and Social Changes" mentioned above was written in 1959) and he still did so even in the 1960s when he began to discuss "the extrinsic theory of thought" . In his papers published in the 1960s, fundamentally speaking, Geertz developed his vision of culture and paid attention to the close connection between culture and action process an one hand; and an the other secured the macro - location for the cultural layer in Parsons' multivariate framework, believing that there exists three relatively independent systems such as culture, society and personality and the system of culture functions affords the latter two information resources and directs their orientation. His failure to discuss directly the intrinsic tension between these two respects is most likely because of his concern to demonstrate the relative autonomy of the cultural process, having not bestowed deeper consideration an the tension starting from the social noumenon characteristic of Parsons' framework. "Ideology as the Cultural System" published in 1964 is an example in this respect. This widely - influential paper criticizes Parsons' point of view understanding ideology as the reflection of the tension between society and personality, holding that this point of view, a theory of reducibility similar to that of Marx understanding ideology as the reflection of economic benefits, overlooks the relative autonomy of ideology as a cultural system. And theories of reducibility "all advance directly from cause analysis to result analysis, having never taken the earnest consideration of ideology as the symbolic system in interaction. " (1973 , 207) According to Geertz, ideology is inspected in historical changes and transformations and the transformed society is found producing cultural tension (such as conceptual confusion) apart from social crises and psychological tension, thanks to which ideologies appear one after another, attempting to provide new meaning modes for changing the process, with a result of success or of failure. It is the task of concrete research how to comment and analyse every concrete ideology but in principle, changing the process cannot be without the guidance of ideology. In this long paper, Geertz's vision of noumenon is obviously expressed and Geertz even takes up three pages to discuss "the extrinsic theory of thought" and two pages to discuss that symbolic meaning originates from the process of social action, demanding that the symbolic action be studied (1973 , 214 - 216 , 211 - 213) . Nevertheless, this analysis of the question of ideology is unfolded in the multivariate framework and is isolated in the cultural system for treatment , and is thought to supply a guidance procedure for social process and personality process, which is typically embodied in that closely after the discussion of "the extrinsic theory of thought" , Geertz cites in long paragraphs Parsons' theory of modulus control to illustrate cultural function in social process and personality process (1973 , 216 - 217) .

In the 1970s, Geertz's arguments obviously changed, in respect of which, his paper entitled "After Revolution: The Fate of Nationalism in the New Nations" merits a detailed exploration. The beginning statements of this paper is based an the vision of noumenon directly criticizing Parsons' multivariate system framework. Geertz first points out that the feasibility of Parsons' concept of culture is entirely dependent an whether or not the relationship between cultural process and social process can be defined in detail. He believes that both Parsons' argument in the 1950s concerning the socialization of culture into motivation and the institutionalization of it into standards , as well as the viewpoint about the theory of modulus control in Parsons' theory of social evolution are not satisfying. Then, Geertz makes a detailed comment an and criticism of Parsons' definition of "ideology" cited. Ideology is treated primarily as a "belief system" in Parsons' definition which, Geertz criticizes, glosses over the moral tension dwelling in ideological activities, dimming the intrinsic foundation of the great social impetus. Geertz thereby puts the question into the action layer for discussion: "The changing of ideology, instead of an independent stream of thought and instead of keeping abreast with and reflecting (or determining) social process, is one dimension of social process itself . " "Nationalism is not the simple by - product of social changes but is the essential content of social changes in many newly - emerging nations. It is the thing itself changed rather than the reflection, cause, manifestation of or the impetus for the changes. " "Fundamentally, in the nationalism of the newly - emerging nations, the tension between essentialist strains and epochalist strains is not that between different passions of thought but is instead the tension between different social systems of organization with incoordinate cultural meanings. " (1973 , 244 , 251 - 252) The peculiarity and content of nationalism as " the information resource" guiding collective behaviors in changing process depend an the process proper. The methodized "belief system" by experts an ideology merely manifests some persons' attempt to make some respects of the changing process escalate to consciousness so as to control changes. It is obvious that such a discussion does not so much define in detail the relationship between culture and society, as it makes definite the integrativeness in shaping social process and meaning mode in the flow of action, which, in Giddens' words' "are not two groups of phenomena respectively supplied or a kind of dual antagonism but demonstrate a kind of dualism. "[333 And in the process of this dualism, the creation of and publicity to ideology are but several events in the flow of events of much importance and are not at all the independent operation of the inner world. Let us make a comparison between this and another of Geertz's arguments: "The feature of ideation . . . lies in that its representation is understood an the basis of the various actions that sustain it" , "knowledge sociology . . . is to directly regard knowledge , sentiment , motivation , concepts , imagination , memory and so an . . . as social events. " (1983 , 152 - 153) Although Geertz still confirms the importance of Parsons' concept of culture which is, Geertz thinks, sound provided it is "revised properly", yet, Geertz's discussion shows that such a "proper revision" is actually intended to make Parsons' concept of culture become Geertz's type. It is a kind of "revision" that negates in essence the multivariate framework, by which system analysis is included into action analysis.

Alexander once had a general description of the evolution process of Geertz's comprehension of culture, maintaining that Geertz began to give up Parsons' multivariate framework in his study of culture from mid - 1960s and at the same time was not reconciled to put himself in cultural idealism and then he turned to "accidental action" so as to have a way out of this dilemma. 0343 This is a portrait of Geertz in the eyes of a neo - functionalist who measures Geertz's strong and weak points entirely from the standpoint of multivariate framework but his comment at least proves the flux and reflux experienced in turn by Geertz's vision of noumenon and the multivariate framework.

The early 1970s did see a change. Geertz's papers in this period (including "Politics of Meaning" cited above) demonstrate that the vision of noumenon had already begun to dominate his comprehension of the general social process and was no longer isolated in the cultural dimension. Not accidentally, this period was, as stated in the first section, the period in which Geertz began to drift apart from the science of positivism aimed at the study of law and to establish the standpoint of interpretative anthropology which offered him the possibility to rely less an Parsons' analytical framework, but these two matters are apparently interlinked. In the preface to his book "Cultural Interpretation" written in 1973, Geertz claimed: "Some concerns of mine in the earlier years - - with functionalism for example - - are no longer so important in my mind but my latest concerns - - with semiology for example - - become more lively now. " (1973 , ix) . The standpoint of textualism seen dominating the whole of "Local Knowledge" in which Parsons is quoted many times, in "Cultural Interpretation" was only mentioned once when Geertz discussed that sociology has not any dominant canonical form.

In the light of the themes of this paper, it is necessary here for me to make definite the standpoint of Geertz's vision of noumenon concerning the question of change, especially the question of cultural change. In fact, the discussions above are enough to show that the ontological comprehension of Geertz or even Giddens, is almost directly the comprehension of change. All keep regenerating in the flow of action. No culture or social structure is substantive, they are constantly modeled and remodeled, in which the possibility of dragging dwells. Geertz writes: "the `meaning mode' by which social changes get modeled is created in this changing process itself and this meaning mode will appear unequivocally as the special ideology or strike its roots into the attitudes of the common people and will in return guide social changes to a certainly limited degree. " (1973 , 253) In his paper "The Theory of Penetrating Description" , Geertz cited the example of an incident occurring during among the French occupation, among the Jewish merchants and the Baber tribe in the Morocco mountains in 1912 and illustrated that this incident involved the meaning modes of three parties. In the eyes of Geertz, the mode of this "confusion of tongues" , as he called it, shows that "social conflicts occur not when cultural form stops functioning because of its weakness, uncertainty, hysteresis or negligence," but occurs when cultural form is confronted with abnormal behaviors caused by abnormal situations and orientation. Geertz further thinks that this example actually demonstrates an argument, i. e. , "the mode that reconstructs social relations is the coordinate that rearranges the experiences world and the social form is cultural substrate" (1973 , 28) . Of course, this is not the reflection that culture is reduced to social process and the question is discussed at the action layer rather than at the layer of system and structure. In fact, Geertz delineates a specific mode of changes in which the action of the original cultural mode creates a relationship with the action manifested in other cultural modes and an unusual social interaction is thus brought about, the process of which just means the remodeling of social and cultural dimensions. In another of his papers discussing the Balinese traditional concept of human beings, time and so on, Geertz also points out that new events in the process of Indonesia's transformation such as political leaders with individual charisma and repeated political crises are remodeling the old cultural concepts through their influence over the action pattern (1973 , 409 - 410) .

Geertz did not attempt to be a theoretician of social ontology. What he was more interested in was to understand concretely experienced targets according to his vision. But it is in these various unsystematic discussions that it becomes obvious that changes should be grasped at the action layer and the shaping of culture and that of social structure are not two visions of noumenon of the autonomic process. "Rites and Social Changes" written by Geertz in his earlier years, had already shown that the analysis of change mechanism starting from Parsons' multivariate system framework is difficult to match with the above statement. In this paper, social changes were interpreted with the cultural mode and change not adapted to the mode of social interaction. This 1959 viewpoint by Geertz was actually negated by the viewpoint quoted in the preceding paragraph from "The Theory of Penetrating Description" in which Geertz clearly pointed out that social conflicts cannot be explained by slumps, hysteresis and so on; social conflicts are conflicts of action in fact, while actions are always related to the specific cultural mode; and so the abnormal interaction means the incoordination among different meaning modes rather than the hysteresis and slump of meaning modes. In "Rites and Social Changes" , we can see that what the residents of that small town were confronted with was not the discrepancy or whatever between social interaction pattern and meaning mode (This discrepancy which is unimaginable, amounts to the action of the soulless body an one hand and an the other to the mysterious soul that cannot appear as action) but was the lack of coordination between the new pattern of action caused by the change of that small town and the new meaning mode in the related modeling of it (the ideological loyalty of the residents of that small town for example) and the old pattern of action and its related meaning mode. It is easily understood that actions of different patterns can invite conflicts, which means that different meaning modes are conflicting. What made the residents of the small town conflict was precisely that the old meaning mode demanded they all take part in the funeral, while the new meaning mode (the difficult ideological loyalties for example) made it impossible for them to do so. It is beyond comprehension to describe this process of noumenon as the conflict between the old pattern of meaning and the new mode of action, that is, as the so- called disconnection between cultural and social system.

Nevertheless, such a beyond comprehension interpretation is Parsons' train of thought when he explains the changing mechanism in his multivariate system framework which has an advantage in describing the state of changing process with such conceptions as "disintegration" and "integration" . Because this system analysis - -when employed in analysing changing mechanism - - can only carry out discussions with system as the practical unit, changes will certainly be regarded as the disintegration and regeneration of the functional mutual dependence among cultural, social system (also personality system, etc. ) This changing from the old functional mutual dependence to the new one is embodied in either the concurrent transformation of all the systems, or, in the anticipatory change of a certain system which brings along the change of other systems. The strong color of cultural determinism in modernized theories is closely related to this theoretical logic and so is the theory of cultural modulus control in Parsons' evolutional theory in the 1960s.

IV . The Chinese Cultural Discourse

Under the Domination of Dualism

As demonstrated in the second section, even the vision of culture definitely discussed by Geertz in the Chinese intellectual environment (mainly in the late 1980s and in the early 1990s) was misread or rejected (so it is imaginable that the theory of social noumenon contained in this vision is naturally open to slippage) , to say nothing of its complex intertexture with Parsons' multivariate framework that makes the slippage seem more "automatic". Therefore, it is almost impossible for us to find the direct discussion and distortion of Geertz's vision in this respect. We can only cite several historical facts with circumstantial evidence to show this slippage.

The first historical fact it as far as I know, is that apart from "The Theory of Penetrating Description" , only one paper written by Geertz entitled "Rites and Social Changes: An Example of Java" was published in Chinese an the Chinese mainland up to the end of 1993 and this was carried in the compilation "Foreign Sociology" (1991, vol. 4) . Such a selective hint as to put Geertz in a theoretical journal is to measure him from the standpoint of social theory. As stated in the preceding section, this paper is the most typical one in the two theoretical collections of papers by Geertz, which analyses using the multivariate framework the question of changing mechanism unsuited to analysis by that framework. Conversely speaking, this paper is one in these two collections of papers which is most unrepresentative and most unexpressive of the leading orientation of the two books. This paper is chosen if Geertz is measured from the standpoint of social theory, which precisely manifests the dominating influence of the multivariate system framework. In particular, the Chinese version of this paper is closely followed by the Chinese version of Alexander's paper criticizing Geertz's renunciation of the multivariate framework. And the journal spared considerable space in the same year to interpret the "neo - functionalism" initiated by Alexander. In the preface to Alexander's "Neo - functionalism" introduced in Chinese translation by that journal, Alexander writes: "Functionalism assumes the distinction between personality, culture and society to be essential for social structure while the tensile force produced by the mutual infiltration of them is the sustained root cause of change and control. Apart from `social' or systematic analysis, functionalism exalts the importance of the relatively autonomous culture and socialization as the centre. "(35~ To piece all these together, we have reason to believe this artificial picture of Geertz is not accidental. At least the selection is carried out in the eyes of culture/society dualism. It is unimaginable for that journal - - with cognition of Geertz' vision - - to select this paper rather than other papers that are more representative.

The second historical fact involves Lin Yusheng. No matter from the discussion clue Lin - - as an American - Chinese scholar though - - is in or from the influence of his special papers over the intellectual environment an the Chinese mainland, we have good reason to regard him as the participant or even modeler of cultural discourse (see below). As far as the concrete arguments are concerned, relatively speaking, what is most known to the Chinese intelligentsia should be Geertz's discussion about ideology and this has something to do with Lin Yusheng's repeated quotations from Geertz. While discussing the modern mode of thinking of "the approach to the solution to problems with the aid of ideological culture" , Lin, in his book "The Crisis of the Chinese Ideology" which is widely noticed an the Chinese mainland, cites Geertz's "Ideology as Cultural System" to illustrate that this mode of thinking is of an "extreme ideological nature" , stressing that, starting from here, the mode will easily develop into a thoroughly anti - traditional weapon. C"' Roughly at the same time as the Chinese version of this book published at the end of 1986 , Li Zehou's famous paper entitled "The Duet : Enlightenment and National Salvation" which also approved and cited this paper of Geertz's came out , intending to illustrate that enlightenment had been stopped by a national salvation ideology and movement. C37 3 At the international symposium held in Beijing in the spring of 1989 celebrating the 70th anniversary of "the May 4th Movement" , Lin Yusheng particularly elucidated "The Phenomenon of the Ideologicalization of the Ideas in the May 4th Movement" . This paper first cited Sills' ideational definition of "ideology" which, constructed with the various theories of totalitarianism as the core examples, tends to have a derogatory sense. [38~ Then, the paper also cited Geertz's point of view to illustrate that the ideologicalization of the ideas in the May 4th Movement resulted from the sharpening of the disintegration of the moral order of traditional Chinese society (political order and culture) after the 191-1 Revolution, when people, in the background of political and social crises and cultural loss of direction, resorted to or even intensified ideology so as to relieve worries and uneasiness, thereby "systematically being caught in major mistakes and the wrong path. " Finally, Lin's paper demanded that such a vicious cycle caused by the slippage of eagerness into ideologicalization be cast off , the multivariate and open spirit of rational enlightenment reestablished and modernized systems in various respects constructed. C39)

With the historical circumstances of Lin's discussion put aside (of course, my sympathy goes to Lin's thought an this question carried out in Beijing in the spring of 1989) , we, following the theme of Lin's paper, again find a "distortion" example used against Geertz (see the analysis of Lin Tongqi's paper in the second section) , that is, reducing Geertz's point of view to an irrelevant discussion clue, resulting in the concealment of its essential implication. The gist of Lin Yusheng's paper is: ideology, especially the intensified ideology should not be approved but people in the May 4th Movement fell into the wrong path to it. Sills' ideational definition coincides with this gist and is the theoretical basis for it while Geertz's definition of ideology from changing process is the auxiliary inlet, intended to illustrate that the wrong path of the ideas in the May 4th Movement , not out of pure bewilderment , but has a historical cause. This doubtlessly is the one - sided quotation from Geertz's point of view if contrasted with Geertz's discussion concerning ideology cited in the third section. In the light of the clues in Lin Yusheng's argument, a mistake with reason is a mistake after all. Therefore, Geertz's standpoint that ideological guidance is indispensable to the process of social transformation and the neutral understanding of ideology hidden in it are both rejected imperceptibly. But this is not the most important thing. Not only does Mr. Lin include a neutral discussion of ideology into the derogatory discussion clue of ideology, but more crucially, this distortion - - if practised - - will certainly cause the slippage of Geertz's vision of noumenon and then rouse the cultural theory of reflection based an social/cultural dualism and deduce cultural results from social background process, which is just the focus of Geertz's criticism of the points of view of Parsons and Marx in his paper "Ideology as a Cultural System". We might as well recite Geertz's statement cited in the preceding chapter: "(The view points of Parsons and Marx) both advance directly from cause analysis to result analysis and explore from the failure of taking seriously ideology as the symbolic system in interaction or the meaning mode in operation" . Obviously, here Geertz simply demands that ideological phenomenon be grasped from action process, the standpoint of which, -- if not fully developed in the above paper - - , is clearly seen in another of Geertz's papers entitled "After the Revolution" (Geertz purposely placed the paper after "Ideology as a Cultural System" while compiling "Cultural Interpretation". Therefore , Lin Yusheng's tactics in employing Geertz's discussion of ideology is to reject its vision of social noumenon apparently revealed at this issue and then it is possible to reject its neutral analysis of historical sense and to reduce it to the framework of cultural/social dualism, thereby demonstrating the ideologicalization of the ideas in the May 4th Movement as a culturally wrong response to a crisis in the social system.

In fact, perhaps it is Lin Tongqi's paper that most definitely affirms that Geertz takes the standpoint of cultural/social dualism. It is not hard to imagine that "Rites and Social Changes: An Example of Java" is the chief basis for the argument cited in Lin Tongqi's paper. Besides, some discussions of Geertz who could still follow Parsons' framework in the 1960s can at least be cited in form as the basis of the argument. Lin Tongqi's paper fails to place the issue into a concrete historical thread for inspection and does not pay attention to the changes before and after Geertz's point of view was created and so, after citing the above materials, he easily confirms that Geertz "stresses the distinction between culture and society" and "believes, following Parsons' point of view, that an integrated hierarchy of social action consist of three systems: cultural, social and personality systems which are independent from each other and equally important though mutually interlinked and infiltrated. " Lin Tongqi's paper also explicitly affirms: "Geertz holds that the principal impetus for sociat changes lies in the contradiction between culture and society and that between the meaning structure that directs people's action and the structure of social organization. "

Obviously, the fact that Lin Tongqi's paper overlooks so decidedly uncoordinated materials and affirms that Geertz sticks to cultural/social dualism is directly related to the fact that Lin's paper follows as a whole Descartes' standpoint of separation between mind and material. What is interesting is that Lin Tongqi's paper, after proving Geertz's theory is cultural/social dualism, comments that Geertz's dualism "virtually considers human ideas (i. e. , meaning structure, values, etc. ) as the factors that break the stable state and is the driving power for historical development. " This comment, however, has nothing to do with Geertz. It simply reflects the entire train of thought of Lin Tongqi's paper proper and the intrinsic connection he makes between mind/body dualism and cultural/social dualism.

To sum up the discussions in the second section and in this section, we can see that the fact that Geertz is misread in China is quite thought- provoking. Geertz emphasizes the close connection between culture and the flow of action and thereby further criticizes the multivariate system framework from the standpoint of ontology, while his Chinese readers maintain a contrasting viewpoint a concept of Descartes' "mind" and the cultural/social dualism intrinsically related to it. How do we explain the implications of this?

In principle, we can observe this phenomenon from many angles such as personal inclinations, the shortage of academic resources in Chinese academic circles in the 1980s, the fact that Geertz's vision of noumenon cannot furnish the analytical framework for operation and so on. However, all these are not what my paper is going to discuss.

What my paper stresses is that this general misreading reveals a certain generally - existing concept or thinking mode in the Chinese intellectual environment and I think we can look at this misreading as the angle most characteristic of the history of intellectual thought in Chine. The adherence to the mind/material dualism and cultural/social dualism of Descartes' type is not simply a question of reason but in fact it is the lowest pre-installation of the 21st century Chinese cultural discourse. Only by this can we explain why Geertz was so unanimously misread and left out in the cold during the "cultural fever" of the 1989s. Geertz's vision actually contains the threat of disintegrating Chinese cultural discourse, the loyalty to which is a spiritual tradition or even a spiritual ballast among the Chinese intellectuals. Therefore, the misreadings of Geertz can even be thought of as a self - defensive response of China's cultural discourse.

So far, the most important study in the implicit assumptions of this discourse is Lin Yusheng's discussion concerning "the cultural intellectualistic approach" , which, according to Lin's definitions, "is a basic presumption that only after ideological and cultural revolution has been carried out can social and political revolution be realized" ; "and is the common basic presumption that moulds the different world outlooks of the preceding two generations of intellectuals. "(4°~ This is doubtlessly an important assumption in the cultural discourse and was dominant particularly in the first half of the 20th century. But this is not the most basic assumption at the core of the cultural discourse. The typical instance embodying even deeper assumptions, was provided by Lin Yusheng himself, who, after explicitly criticizing "the cultural intellectualistic approach" , still hankered after discussion an plans for cultural reform and continued to be involved in cultural discourse.

In brief , the core assumptions of this cultural discourse are the dualism of culture (system or process) and society (system or process) as well as Descartes' concept of "mind" as the backbone of the ontologicalization of this dualism. Logically speaking, only from such an assumption is it possible to deduce a principle of action: just as economic development relies an special economic activities, so too, political transformation must rely an special political activities and cultural transformation must rely an a special activity - - the activity of cultural reform. Here, the result of dualism is that the cultural realm is noumenalized - - just as Parsons' theoretical logic results in the noumenalization of his multivariate system as stated at the end of the preceding section. In the overall crisis. and the intellectual environment at the end of the Qing Dynasty and the beginning of the Republic of China (1912 - 1949) , not only were cultural reform activities looked upon as special activities, but also as activities which must be carried out independently and in advance so that other activities would be brought along too. Restrained by the various factors such as system reform, modernization theories and so an in the 1980s, cultural determinism was no longer popular and the activities of cultural reform were roughly thought of as activities that should keep abreast with other ones, and they were all understood as independent activities no matter how they would affect one another.

We must admit that this kind of special activity of cultural reform is activity devoted to the layer of belief , value and thought , it is the intrinsic activity of thought . To be specific, it is presumed that the cultural system cannot automatically or spontaneously create value changes necessary for it in the transformation process but an the contrary, it is likely to automatically slide towards confusion, disorder or evil ( in Descartes' autonomous field of thought, spontaneous value change is indeed unimaginable) . Therefore, it is quite necessary to intentionally design and control cultural changes. This design will result in such schemes as "taking Chinese things as noumenal and Western things as functional" , "wholesale Westernization" , "wholesale anti - tradition" and what not. And this control means such action modes as "new democracy" , "enlightenment" , "rural construction" and so on, from which the cultural discourse running through out the 20th century has grown up. It is obvious that the discussion of this cultural discourse, compared with Geertz's outlook an changes discussed in the preceding chapter, is open to doubt in scientific principle.

V . The Dominating Force of the Cultural Discourse

Some may insist that the fact that Geertz is misread does not have deep implications, but is chiefly a matter of insufficiency of knowledge. Against this query, I feel that to intensively display the Chinese cultural discourse as a traditional vitality and dominating force, it is necessary to particularly analyse a positive case - - that is, Lin Yusheng mentioned above. This seems somewhat inconsistent but it is Lin Yusheng who can demonstrate how the cultural discourse is still able to successfully resist the ideas that can disintegrate the discourse itself and keeps developing in the background that knowledge of Western learning is not inadequate. Through this comparison, we can cognize more concretely and profoundly the misreadings of Geertz.

This chapter will focus its discussion an Lin Yusheng's proposition of "the creative transformation of the Chinese tradition" . The reasons that we choose this case are evident. First, this proposition of Lin Yusheng's increasingly won extensive sympathy in the 1980s "cultural fever", as one commentator said: "Lin Yusheng's `creative transformation of tradition' is the only viewpoint that has not been challenged but has been widely accepted by the Chinese mainland intellectuals among his many viewpoints. "(411 We can simply say in a sense, that "the creative transformation of tradition" is the last scheme of the 20th century Chinese cultural discourse, or at least we can say that it is the focus of cultural debates in modern times. Second, Lin Yusheng's Western learning attainments contain the resource that can disintegrate the core assumption of the cultural discourse. Therefore, in this sense the concern Lin insists an with the reform activities of the Chinese culture indicates a tension others cannot arrive at and typically demonstrates the dominating force of the cultural discourse. Third, Lin Yusheng never keeps aloof from the cultural discourse because he settled in America. On the contrary, Lin, as a student of Yin Haiguang - - "a figure in the late period of the May 4th Movement" , displays the continuity of the 20th century Chinese cultural discourse, which will be discussed in detail in the following paragraphs.

According to Lin Yusheng's own account , in producing the idea of " creative transformation of tradition" , he was inspired and enlightened by R. Bellah's formulation of "creative reformism" in his book entitled "Asian Religions and Progress in Modern Times" and Bellah's formulation was created "under the direct influence of Weber"[421(317 - 318) which obviously refers to Weber's "Ethics of Protestantism and Spirit of Capitalism" . Elsewhere Lin Yusheng claims that people can understand in form the formulation of "creative transformation" by intensively reading Weber's book.(64)

This academic origin has given a hint that the so - called "creative transformation of tradition" mainly involves cultural dimensions, referring to a special activity of cultural reform. As a matter of fact, the framework in which Mr. Lin makes his discussion belongs to the typical cultural/social dualism. Although with veiled criticisms of Parsons, Lin Yusheng does not hesitate to use this multivariate framework (the framework of Parsons is closely related to Weber while the study of Japan's Techuan Religion" by Bellah who was a disciple of Parsons follows the train of thought of "Weber's proposition". Mr. Lin writes: "One of the important starting points in understanding today's culture and society is the mutual irreducibility of cultural and social systems. It is necessary to make a distinction between the cultural layer of thought , belief and value and the social and political structure layer of social , political and economic organizations though the two layers affect each other. " (194) Here, the noumenal separation is evident. Mr. Lin does not mention that this is the analytical distinction. He just discusses entirely in a tone that there are two layers different in nature. In another place, Lin Yusheng states more directly: "The relationship between the cultural system (including thought, belief and value) and the social system (including politics , economics and social behavior mode) is not the unitary one of reducibility though the two affect each other. In other words, a lot of disgusting behavior modes and systems in tradition are created not entirely by traditional thought and value which are created not entirely by traditional political system or economic production pattern. " (313) . The social system includes "behavior mode and system" which the cultural system becomes thought, value and belief an the spiritual side, the two of which possibly do not affect each other. In other words, there exists the ability of self - generation and operation within these two systems. Obviously, this is the distinction made in "Rites and Social Changes" written by Geertz in his earlier years.

When Lin Yusheng separates the cultural and social system, he fully demonstrates the rigid nature of dualism. In fact, it is an the basis of such a rigid dualism that Lin Yusheng creates the structural features of traditional China and the historical dilemma of modern China and further brings about the solution to creative transformation. His entire train of thought, lucid and lively, is to a considerable extent concerned with the simplification of the issue by this dualism. According to Lin Yusheng's view point, the characteristics of traditional China rested with the high degree integration of her social - political order and her cultural - moral order through the linkage of the general monarchic power. Therefore, the abstract ideal and value in the cultural-moral order had definitely displaying patterns, that is, "the Chinese in the past would be quite clear about which concrete behavior is the display of ` loyalty' and which is the display of ` righteousness' (221) . Roughly speaking , this is what Parsons calls the institutionalization of cultural system as the "standards" of social system. Since modern times, this highly integrated order gradually collapsed and up to the 1911 Revolution when general monarchic power crumbles, the political - social order tended towards disorganization. This social system's loss of standards meant at the same time the disintegration of cultural - moral order because it had already lost the hawser - - the specific and concrete displaying pattern in the social - political order. However, "what is the nature of `justice'? And what is the concrete displaying pattern of ` justice' ? These two questions are not open to different explanations and answer" (221) . Lin Yusheng explicitly points out that only when the historical dilemma of "the disappearance of traditional standards and the different labor of new standards" (in respect of the social system) was confronted with was it possible to put forward the proposition that the creative transformation of the Chinese tradition (in respect of the cultural system) be carried out (84) . And from this we can see that dualism governs the entire train of thought of Lin Yusheng, which can also be found in a basic criticism of his of the anti - traditional discussions in the May 4th Movement : "The anti - tradition intellectuals could not discriminate the difference between the standards of the traditional society and the political operation they loathed and the value of the symbols of the traditional culture" (167) . In reality, viewing from Lin Yusheng's various expressed opinions, we can find that while approving the the May 4th Movement's attack an traditional society and are political system, he only lays stress an the practice of creative transformation of cultural and moral system. It is not hard to see that the tradition mentioned by Lin Yusheng actually refers to various thoughts, values and symbols which have lost the hawser of their specific displaying pattern and thus the creative transformation of tradition becomes purely a kind of intrinsic spiritual operation directly faced with abstract value.

In reality, the "intentional" design of Lin Yusheng's scheme in operation and the control itself also hint at the operation of Descartes' "mind". This is an "intentional" action with which to tide over "the Chinese ideological crisis". Mr. Lin writes: "At the practical operation layer, the creative transformation contains the following two moves : " (1) first ` localizing' the traditional qualities with resort to what Weber calls ` ideational or rational analysis' ; (2 ) then, relocalizing those qualities determined worth reforming and reorganizing in the process and turning them into the seeds of changing and simultaneously continuing to maintain cultural identification in the changing. It is surprising for this action to be intentional. In fact, Lin Yusheng always criticizes Hu Shi, Liang Shiqiu and even Lu Xun for not being able to "intentionally" and "conscientiously" follow after the creative transformation of tradition. Lin Yusheng even mentions that although there is innocence left in Ah Q, yet it "cannot be understood as the possible source that produces knowledge from inside and moral change or as the stimulation by which to accept this change from outside. AQ is short of the intrinsic ego, which hinders that point and without self - awakening, he cannot intentionally cultivate and develop this good factor." (the underlined dots are added by me) . This manifests Lin Yusheng's idea of Descartes' "mind" . Mr. Lin affords an exemplary illustration of this basic plan of cultural reform through his profound concern as to whether liberalism will strike roots in China (193 - 195) .

It can be easily felt that this inference of Lin Yusheng's "to detach oneself from the fetters of the May 4th Movement ideas so as to shoot at the pinwheel of them" has very explicitly relied an the dual antagonism between cultural and social system from beginning to end. Furthermore, Mr. Lin explicitly publicizes the dominating rote of "being intentional" in cultural changes, holding that the final goal to arrive at is to establish new thoughts, values and beliefs in people's "awareness" and "mind" logically connecting the tradition and Western modern values. Depending an the multivariate system framework of Western sociology, Lin Yusheng has sorted out the cultural discourse represented by the May 4th Movement ideas. By the ideational definition of the " thinking mode " - - the cultural intellectualistic approach " , Lin Yusheng brings to light its tendency to ideological and cultural determinism and then refuses it. This clearing up of the ambiguousness in cultural discourse makes the question of core assumption pointed an the contrary and in this sense, Lin Yusheng is a typical person who grasps the essence of the 20th century Chinese cultural discourse. Through Lin Yusheng, the tension between the cultural and social dualism contained in the cultural discourse and Geertz's vision of noumenon becomes evident. Therefore, there comes a question: For, all of Lin Yusheng's knowledge, experience and academic quality, how could he take up such a dualist and intentionally controlled Position? Polanyi and Kern both produced wonderful discussions of the inseparability of the generation of spiritual natural endowments and behavior operation, not to mention the concern by Polanyi and Hayerch with the unartificial social evolution or not to mention that "Weber proposition" is only the description of an unartificial pursuit. Polanyi points out: "we cannot directly choose a set of new values but can only bear them in mind while creating or practising them"(431 , and both he and Kern take the learning course of scientific theories and formulae in the discussion of the theory of knowledge for example, which is typically expressed as the fact that one still cannot solve the exercises with the formulae and notes in the texts which he thinks he has already understood them. A practical course of mastery always relies an one's personal work at the typical exercises (examples) so as to produce tacit understanding experience that only belongs to the one himself (by a pen or an experiment) and only by relying an this experience can one have a real command of the express formulae. [4a) This analysis and Geertz's vision are manifestly identical, an which we even can make explanatory notes by directly citing Geertz's statement that "The characteristic of ideation . . . lies in that one must understand its representation in terms of the action which sustains it. " In fact, the analysis of this fact of reason made by Polanyi and the like - - as philosopher is more detailed and penetrating than that by Geertz. The former, if with some inadequacy, perhaps carry out their discussions not by way of talking about culture but about the theory of knowledge and thereby the discussions are inclined to the respect of intellectuals.

To the discussion in this respect, Lin Yusheng did not pay attention. On the contrary, what Lin approved and cited Polanyi (also Kern) is chiefly the discussion that this emphasis and examples contact each other and then invisibly form into "subsidiary awareness" . In Lin Yusheng's discussion frame concerning freedom and tradition, the order of freedom "the extrinsic freedom" relies an abstract and general regulations and Mr. Lin just cited the above point of view of Polanyi to illustrate the way in which these difficult - to - formulate regulations are imparted and carried forward. As to "intrinsic freedom" , Lin principally cited Sills' "Charisma" definition to illustrate its dependence an authority resources (65 - 87) . More importantly , this citation not only is not limited to the relationship between freedom and tradition, but also extends to the general problem of culture. For instance, while discussing the reconstruction of the Chinese humane spirit , Lin Yusheng stressed : "it will do only to produce concrete experiences of the various respects of the Chinese humane spirit. In accordance with Polanyi's theory of knowledge, we understand that cultural lifeblood that continues through being constantly created chiefly originates from the `subsidiary awareness' that cannot become apparent in people's mind rather than the ` focal awareness' that can be expressed outwardly. This `subsidiary awareness' can be derived from the invisible and formative influence when contacting a cordial and concrete instance. " (354) According to Lin Yusheng, Mr. Zhong Lihe's concrete humane spirit came into being by selecting the essence while unconsciously affected by the rural environment of the Chinese culture he stayed in (360) . In this discussion, Lin Yusheng also cited Kern, emphasizing that scientists obtain the specific scientific traditions "from the invisible and formative influence an them in their contacting the concrete examples they are studying and their practical operation experiences" (363) .

What best shows the tension between Lin Yusheng's knowledge resources and his dual framework is the wonderful analysis he made while commenting an Liang Shiqiu. Against the background that the traditional cultural and moral order had been disorganized since the 1911 Revolution and the traditional abstract ideal and value had no concrete action pattern available, Lin Yusheng pointed out "Only a stable relationship between the concrete action pattern of tradition (or traditionalism) and the abstract ideal and value can ensure the survival of moral conservatism in society. In other words, a vital moral conservatism in society is assuming or is able to establish this stable relationship, an the strength of which, the abstract ideal and value can be believed to display themselves only through those concrete action patterns. Therefore, to preserve the concrete action patterns of tradition or traditionalism is to preserve the abstract ideal and value. " Therefore, the problem of conservatism lies in: "They tend to debate for the preservation of the Chinese moral tradition from the general point of view but cannot create the new and concrete displaying patterns in the society for the moral value and ideal of tradition or traditionalism." (223) If a comparison is made between Lin Yusheng's discussion an the attempt of traditionalism to reestablish traditional value and his plan to make liberalism strike roots, the incoordination between them will be evident.

Of course, in form, it is not impossible for Lin Yusheng to produce various flexible tactics but it is an all accounts difficult for him to avoid the tension the above -mentioned noumenal vision brings about to his standpoint. After all, he cannot stop at simply reducing action mode and actions to the layer of social system which dim his standpoint of "creative transformation of tradition" through corroding the distinction between cultural and social dualism.

Directly related to the theme of my paper is just the fact that this setup reveals the dominating and controlling force of the cultural discourse core assumption. 47 Even Polanyi's authoritative knowledge resources which Lin Yusheng has so sincere a belief in cannot make him feel his standpoint threatened either. Naturally, such domination of the cultural discourse is realized not through the logical inference of the core assumption but through numerable events : it is moulded through someone's experiences. But this is no longer a question of formal logic or not even a question of pure intellect. As a matter of fact, to identify and participate in this discourse is to generate a kind of disposition. This is, just as Geertz states, gradually moulded and maintained by many actions and events. The operation pattern of this discourse has become the important content of the experiences silently comprehended by Lin Yusheng because he was been involved in the discourse of 20th century Chinese cultural discourse for many years. What is interesting is that Lin Yusheng's "subsidiary awareness" is formed just through contacting " examples" , the typical instance showing which is the moving association of Lin Yusheng with Yin Haiguang.

Mr. Lin Yusheng once excitedly made a self account: "During the 26 years (since I graduated from Taipei University) , the spirit resource affecting me most is that experience when I studied as a disciple of Mr. Yu . . . while contacting him, I had already breathed something really vital which promoted me in my coming 26 years to continue to strive for the development of the thoughts and spirit developed by Mr. Yin" (103) . Then, what contents does the spirit resource which so affected Lin Yusheng touch upon? Yin Haiguang thinks himself to be "a figure in the later period of the May 4th Movement" and even thinks himself to be such an "ideal" representative whose men of the same line are difficult to find of "the Chinese intellectuals" as inseparable from the emblem of the May 4th Movement. (45~ According to his self account, the goal Mr. Yin seeks is iconoclasm and enlightenment,[46) which are two sides of the same coin. Lin Yusheng's generalization of Yin Haiguang's practices of struggle is roughly inclusive in concrete contents of the latter's opposition to the Chinese tradition, his initiation and publicity of science and democracy and his tenacity of liberalism , etc. (103 , 308) . We can see by a slight comparison that the prototype of almost all the questions Lin Yusheng is concerned about can be found in Yin Haiguang and this prototype relation is sometimes successional and sometimes is conversational. Therefore, in concrete contact with Yin Haiguang, Lin realized his "existential participation" (this term is borrowed from Polanyi) in the cultural discourse and transformed the basic questions of that discourse into his own. At the same time, the assumption of that discourse had become his attitude. It was when Lin dwelled in the circumstances of this question that he absorbed knowledge and constructed his framework and thus Polanyi was in no position to disintegrate his train of thought.

Interestingly, the parties all have strong identification and conscientiousness of cultural discourse's marginal extension in the 1950s and 1960s. Yin localized himself as "a figure in the later period of the May 4th Movement" and he traced back the imagery of the "May 4th Movement" - - "the Chinese intellectuals" precisely to Yan Fu and Liang Qichao who are generally acknowledged to have initiated the question of cultural reform at the end of the Qing Dynasty: "While ruminating an Chinese history in these dozens of years, I find that all the public figures are green apples except Messrs Yan Fu and Liang Qichao who comparatively had some well - considered opinions. " And again Yin said: "The Chinese intellectuals since the May 4th Movement, down from Hu Shi, have all disappeared far away from the sky like the clouds puffed away by the wind. "[47) It seems to Lin Yusheng that "Yin can make the age of the May 4th Movement last for several dozens of years in Chinese history with his single efforts in various adverse circumstances" (334) . Zhang Hao another disciple of Yin Haiguang said: "In these 20 years, Mr. Yin is almost the only spiritual bridge connecting the May 4th Movement and the generation of us at the corner of Taiwan. "C48] It should be mentioned that when some debaters in the 1980s opined that Yin Haiguang's practical work in the 1950s and 1960s in Taiwan had embodied a different discussion from that of the May 4th Movement and thus precipitated an the contrary the break with the ideas in the May 4th Movement,[49) Lin Yusheng lost no time in responding with disapproval to these inferences. He enumerated Yin's discussions in basic problems and standpoint as being similar to those of the May 4th Movement , emphasizing that it would coincide more closely with historical fact to describe the relationship between Yin and the May 4th Movement with the term "development". He particularly pointed out: "This is not a mere question of interpretation of the 20th century Chinese ideological and cultural history. "(s0)

To sum up , Lin Yusheng's contact with Yin Haiguang (of course , there are also other factors, the low-level cultural debates in the journal) "Cultural Stars" for example also stimulated the desire of Lin to sort out the questions) representatively revealed the historical time - and - space position of "the creative transformation of tradition" . We have reason to affirm that it was Lin Yusheng's contact with such an anti - traditional representative with the spirit of great personality that made him whole - heartedly throw himself into the debate of this anti - traditional standpoint. In Lin Yusheng, the cultural discourse is inseparable from many values and "the May 4th Movement" , "enlightenment" , "liberalism" and "intellectual" , etc. are all related to this discourse. Therefore, Lin Yusheng's view point and their influence can be understood only in the specific threads of the 20th century Chinese cultural discourse. An evident fact is that the reason that Lin Yusheng's proposition has aroused a wide response is closely bound up with the location of most intellectuals in this discourse. And it is precisely because most the intellectuals are still in the excitement and indignation of anti - tradition that Mr. Lin's theory of "creative transformation of tradition" is found to be fresh and new. So long as the proposition is measured in scientific principle with the discourse divorced, it will seem specious.

When turning back to the theme of my paper, I can say that not only does the case of Mr. Lin Yusheng show the antagonistic relationship between Geertz's vision and the core assumptions of cultural discourse but also shows what strength this discourse throws into the practice of avoiding and slipping the intellectual resources that can disintegrate its assumption when it has become a concrete and lively tradition.

How China has constituted such a powerful cultural discourse is not a question my paper can deal with here. What I can point out is that the answer to this question should be found more in the historical threads of 20th century modernization with its repeated setbacks, than in the field of her ideological history. The fact that Chinese modernization repeatedly met with setbacks furnishes the catalyst for the expansion of some ideations which failed to be in the ascendant in other part of the world, though available. The discussion of all these matters should be left for another thesis.

NOTES

(1) Geertz has written much but most of his publications are the experience studies. His comparatively theoretical discussions are mainly included in the following two selections of papers: The Interpretation of Cultures , New York: Basic Books, Inc. , 1973; Local Knowledge: Further Essays Interpretative Anthropology , New York: Basic Books, Inc. , 1983. The materials of the Chinese mainland intellectuals' readings of Geertz I have seen so far also principally involve these two selections an which my discussions in this paper mainly depend. While citing, I only add to the citations the pages cited from these two selections which are respectively referred to by 1973 and 1983.

(2) See The History of Economic Analyses (vol.2) , translated by Zhu Yang and others, Beijing: the Commercial Press, 1991, pp. 71- 72.

(3) See J. C. Alexander & Steven Seidman eds. , Culture and Society: Contemporary Debates, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1990, Part 1, Introduction, p.14.

(4) See Foreign Sociology , vol . 3 , 1991; Alexander's comments an Geertz was put into Chinese by Feng Sui. The original is the first chapter of the book Theories of Sociology Since 1945 written by Alexander.

(5) This term originates from "On Thought: The Extrinsic Theory" written by Galanter and M. Gernstenhaber, Psychology Review , 63 (1956) , pp. 218 - 227 .

(6) See R Rorty: Philosophy and Nature's Mirror , translated by Li Youzheng, Beijing, Sanlian Bookstore Press, 1978. The first chapter entitled "The Invention of Mind" of the book produces a wonderful and brief analysis of the conception of "mind" in the Western philosophical history.

(7) Ryle: The Conception of Mind , translated by Liu Jianrong, Shanghai Translation Press, 1988, p.85. Geertz cited the essay in his paper entitled "Religions as Cultures", 1937, p.96.

(8) Ibid , p.29. (9)Ibid, p.301.

(10) Wittgenstein: Philosophical Studies , translated by Tang Chao and Fan Guangdi, Sanlian Bookstore Press, 1992, pp.74-84.

(11) Although Geertz does not definitely declare that "the extrinsic theory of thought" is divided into these two respects, yet this fact proves evident in his various related discussions. What can be more used as a proof is the fact that Geertz respectively definitionally referred these two respects with "the extrinsic theory of thought" . See: The Interpretation of Cultures , notes an p. 362 and original text an p.214.

(12) The Conception of Mind , p.55.

(13) "A Selection of Polanyi's Speeches: Studies an Man, Scientific Belief and Society, Knowledge by Silent Comprehension", translated by Peng Haidong, Taipei, Lianjing Publishing House, 1985, p.37.

(14) Polanyi and Pulosh: "Meaning", translated by Peng Haidong, Taipei, Lianjing Publishing House, 1984, p.46.

(15) "A Selection of Polanyi's Speeches" , p . 182 .

(16) "Symbol" has various interpretations. At least, it can either reflect the abstract symbol itself or refer to the concrete actions and objects in this symbol form. For instance, " + " as the abstract symbol is of course very different from the sign of a specific person crossing himself/herself in the specific space and time. Observed from this distinction, Geertz's definitions of "symbols" all stress that they refer to concrete matters, for example: "(symbol is) any object, behavior, event, nature or relation as the vehicle of conception" , 1973 , 91; " (symbols are) the objects in experience which people give meanings to" , 1973 , p. 362.

(17) Rock: The Theory of Human Understanding , translated by Guan Wenyun, Beijing, the Commercial Press , 1959 , vol . 2 , Chapter 1.

(18) The Chinese versions here are cited from Deng Zhenglai's translation of Geertz's "Local Knowledge: A Perspective of the Comparison between Facts and Laws" (an unpublished manuscript).

(20) See: "Culture and Action - - An Inspection of Cultural Anthropology" translated and compiled by Gu Jianguang, Sichuan People's Press, 1988, the Preface, pl.

(21) For example, the Study an Bali's cockfighting game made by Geertz - - "a phenomenological anthropologist" was briefly touched upon in Fu Baoshi's "`Figurative Basis' and `Cultural Codes'

Enlightenments from the Comparison between the Chinese and American Academic Cultures" carried in Fudan University Journal , 1986, vol. 3.

(22) "Culture: China and the World (first collection)", Sanlian Bookstore Press, 1987; Yuxiao's Chinese version of "Penetrating Description" (Feichi checked) , pp261 - 298. The pages of all the citations from the Chinese version are noted without further notices. Similarly, the pages of The Chinese Social Sciences are noted wherever Lin Tongqi's special discussions are cited.

(23) Anthony Giddens: The Constitution of Society , Oxford: Polity Press, 1984, p.20 which most clearly expresses the implication of "formule" .

(24) Ibid .

(25) Wang Hailong: An Introduction to Anthropology , Guangxi Education Press, 1989, p.294.

(26) Tong Enzheng: The Cultural Anthropology , Shanghai People's Press, 1989, p.255.

(27) Chen Guojiang (chief editor) and Wan Yilong (deputy chief editor): A Concise Dictionary of Cultural Anthropology , Zhejiang People's Press, 1990.

(28) Nationality Translations , 1988, vol 1.

(29) Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society , introduction, xxxvii.

(30) Hamilton: "Parsons", translated by Gai Mingzheng, Taipei, Guiguan Books Inc. , 1990, pp.65 -66; pp.71-73.

(31) The narrations here are done mainly according to : (1) Anthony Giddens, "Functionalism : apres la lutte" and "Notes an the Theory of Structuration" carried in his book entitled Studies in Social and Political Theory , New York, Basic Books Inc. , 1977, pp96- 135; (2) particularly the introduction and the first chapter in The Constitution of Society .

(32) See: Nicky Gregson, "On the (ir) Relivances of Structuration Theory to Empirical Research", in Social Theory of Modern Societies : Anthony Giddens and His Critics , Held Darid ed. , Cambridge University Press, 1989 , pp235 - 248.

(33) The Constitution of Society , p.25.

(34) See: Note (4).

(35) See: Parsons: The Structure and Process of Modern Societies , translated by Liang Xiangyang, Guangming Daily Press. Especially see: "Several basic features of the industrialized world" in the book Parsons : Social Evolution , translated by Zhang Yinghua, Taipei, Yuanliu Publishing Inc. , 1991. This book was compiled from Parsons' two books published respectively in 1966 and 1971 by his student Toby.

(36) Foreign Sociology , 1991, vol. 3.

(37) See: Lin Yusheng, The Crisis of the Chinese Consciousness , translated by Mu Shanpei, Guizhou People's Press, 1988, (enlarged and updated) , p.86.

(38) Discussion an the Chinese Modern Ideological History , Dongfang Press, 1987, p.23.

(39) Geertz takes Shils as one of the typical examples while illustrating the derogatory sense of "ideology" in Ideology as a Cultural System. See: The Interpretation of Cultures , pp.197 - 198. In Lin Yusheng, "ideology" is definitely regarded as something that should be watched out for and rejected. Furthermore, Mr. Lin understands "ideology" mainly an the basis of the discussions which have been all along carried out by Sills. See: Lin Yusheng, "The Political Order and the Multivariate Society" (Taipei, 1987) . Therefore, the fact does pass comprehension that Lin Yusheng is able to put Geertz and Shils into the same discussion clue, ignoring the former's criticism of the latter and the former's argumentation to neutralize "ideology" .

(40) See: Lin Yusheng, "Recognition of the Ideological Enlightenment Movement During the May 4th Movement Period" carried in A Collection of Papers at the International Symposium Celebrating the 70th Anniversary of the May 4th Movement.

(41) See: Note (38), pp.46-47, the Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1989, first volume, pp139146.

(42) Gu Yi: "On `the Creative Transformation of Tradition' - - A Discussion with Lin Yusheng", carried in his book "The Historical View of the Chinese Enlightenment Movement" , Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1992, p117.

(43) Lin Yusheng: "The Creative Transformation of the Chinese Tradition", Beijing, Sanlian Bookstore Press, 1988, p316. The numbers added to the citations thereafter all refer to the pages of this book.

(44) "A Collection of Polanyi's Speeches" , p67.

(45) Ibid , p.182. And Kern: "Again an Canonical Form" in "The Necessary Tension", translated by Ji Shuli and others, Fujian People's Press, 1987, pp.289-319.

(46)"Complete Selection from Yin Haiguang: 10 - - A Collection of Yin Haiguang's Letters", Taipei, Guiguan Books Inc. , 1989, p111. A Letter to Lin Yusheng an December 1, 1966.

(47) Ibid , p .150 - 151, A Letter to Lin Yusheng , September 20 , 1968 .

(48 ] Ibid , p. 130 , A Letter to Lin Yusheng, May 9 , 1968 .

(49) Zhang Hao: "An Untraversed Road" carried in "Complete Selections from Yin Haiguang: 18 -- A Collection of Yin Haiguang's Red - Letter Days" , Taipei, Guiguan Books Inc. , 1989 , p164.

(50) Lin Yusheng: "Afterthoughts an `The historical Dialective of Taiwan Positive Discourse"' carried in Taiwan Social Studies Quarterly , 1989 , the spring volume (No. 1) , especially an p.195 .

Cheng Nong: Vice Professor in People's University of China.